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COMMENTS
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME: TOO MUCH OF A
GOOD THING?
I. INTRODUCTION
Headlines announcing recent declines in crime rates have
become commonplace across the United States.' In 1997, Atlan-
ta, Georgia, experienced a 22% drop in homicides, an 11% de-
cline in burglaries, and a 21% decline in larceny.2 In Washing-
ton, D.C., the number of homicides dropped 24% in 1997.
From 1996 to 1997, the homicide rate in New York fell 23%; in
Los Angeles it dropped 20%; and in San Antonio it dropped17%.4
The reports usually seek an explanation for the declines.5 A
number of factors may be responsible: better police depart-
ments, improved weapons and training, "tough on crime" politi-
cal agendas,6 a stronger economy, and a general change in
1. See, e.g., Robert Suro, Drop in Murder Rate Accelerates in Cities; District, P.G.
County Among Leaders in Trend, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1997, at Al; Jack Warner,
City's Drop in Homicides a Victory, Campbell Says, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 1,
1998, at B2.
2. See Warner, supra note 1.
3. See Suro, supra note 1.
4. See id,
5. According to Atlanta's Chief of Police, the recent decline in crime rate "can't
be attributed to any one thing, [but factors include] more police, more bike patrols,
[and] more horse patrols. Warner, supra note 1.
6. One example is former President Bush's program for fighting crime: "We're
going to take back the streets. By taking criminals off the street. It's an attack on
all four fronts-new laws to punish them, new agents to arrest them, new prosecu-
tors to convict them, and new prisons to hold them." John A. Martin & Michelle
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moral attitudes.' Some credit an aging gang population and the
stabilization of gang territories.8 However, there is one factor
that has become the subject of increasing debate among schol-
ars: the federal government's growing involvement in local law
enforcement matters.9 The passage of laws by Congress, prose-
cution in federal courts, and imprisonment in federal peniten-
tiaries have clearly played some role in the recent decline of
crime rates in the United States. However, unselfconscious and
haphazard federal criminal legislation does not come without
costs, such as lowered quality of justice, which may outweigh
any benefits."
The participation of the federal government in law enforce-
ment has been a subject of controversy before this latest decline
in crime rates, and federalization is not without its critics to-
Travis, Symposium: Assembly-line Justice: Preserving Fair Process for Indigent Defen-
dants in an Overloaded System, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 69, 80 (1992) (quoting
President Bush Proposes New Anti-Crime Measures, NATL INST. OF JUST. REP., July-
Aug. 1989, at 7).
7. A wide variety of factors including higher rates of incarceration, a
strong economy, a shrinking youth population and more effective police
strategies are being cited to explain the broad reduction in violent crime
registered nationwide. But no single factor seems to explain the sustained
pace of the decline. "All the usual explanations do not really account for
why we are seeing such sharp drops now on top of several years of de-
creased crimes," said Cheryl Maxson, a research associate at the Univer-
sity of Southern California's Social Science Research Institute.
Suro, supra note 1.
8. -[T]he fact remains that both police and the criminal justice system have
benefited [sic] from factors they really had no control over. the aging of the popula-
tion and the maturing of the crack market,' which meant fewer criminal turf wars
between drug dealers, Fyfe [a Temple University criminologist] said." FBI: Violent
Crimes in U.S. Decreased 7 Percent in 1996, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 2, 1997, at
Al.
9. This concept, the "federalization of crime," generally refers to congressional
legislation "that provides for federal jurisdiction over criminal conduct that could also
be prosecuted by state or local authorities." Rory K Little, Myths and Principles of
Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1085 n.2 (1995).
10. See H. Scott Wallace, Compulsive Disorder: Stop Me Before I Federalize Again,
PROSECUTOR, May/June 1994, at 21, 22 ("The fact is that the runaway growth of
federal criminal jurisdiction has been unremittingly haphazard and without regard for
its actual impact on the battle against crime nationwide."); see also Gerald G.
Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L REV.
789, 794 (1996) ("Criminalization on both the state and federal level tends to be
reactive, and consequently politically influenced. Rather than predicting antisocial
behavior before it occurs, legislatures tend to respond to particular incidents of harm-
ful behavior after it happens.").
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day." Some argue federalization of crime. is a threat to the
sovereignty of the states and undermines the expression of
federalism in our government.' 2 Some police and law enforce-
ment officials explain that the increased federal role "only
serves to blur investigative authority, [waste] local exper-
tise.., and create unrealistic expectations among citizens."'3
Others question the federal interest in local criminal prosecu-
tions, which were traditionally within the exclusive domain of
the states,'4 and assert that federalization is responsible for
swamping federal courts and stalling dockets. 5 Still others
doubt that the reality is as harsh as this depiction and label
such characterizations as a mere "federalization myth."6
The purpose of this comment is to examine the trend toward
the federalization of criminal law enforcement, identify some of
its costs and benefits, and evaluate its effectiveness as a means
of addressing both the nation's and the states' crime problem.
Part II will outline the history of the trend toward federaliza-
tion of criminal legislation; Part HI will identify some prelimi-
nary issues and provide two examples; Part IV will examine the
federal caseload; and Part V will identify some guiding princi-
ples for the evaluation of future federalization efforts.
II. HIsToRIcAL BACKGROUND
During the birth of the United States, the federal govern-
ment was conceived as separate and distinct from the states.
11. One of the earliest examples of federal criminal legislation is the Sherman
Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994)). See Ashdown, supra note 10, at 791.
12. See id.
13. Police Executive Research Forum Opposes Federalizing Crimes, CRE!. JUST.
NEWSL., July 15, 1994, at 3.
14. Unites States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia told members of Con-
gress, "[m]urder is not a federal crime; murder of the president is." Martin & Travis,
supra note 6, at 80 (citing to Nancy E. Roman, Justices Hammer Needless Laws,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at A4).
15. See Hon. Sam J. Ervin, The Federalization of State Crimes: Some Observations
and Reflections, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 761 (1996).
16. See Little, supra note 9, at 1032. Professor Little questions "some of the com-
monly expressed presuppositions of the federalization debate" and stylizes them as
"myths.- Id. at 1032.
1998] 907
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:905
James Madison explained his vision of the federal arrangement
in The Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefi-
nite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, such as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign com-
merce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the
most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
states will extend to all objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.17
The United States Constitution gave no power to the federal
government to control activities that fell outside of its limited
domain, 8 and its activities were initially limited to those that
were peculiarly federal. The purpose of federal criminal law
enforcement power was to govern activity that interfered with
or injured the federal government itself.9 This primarily in-
cluded activity that crossed jurisdictions, such as interstate
commerce, 20 or activity that exclusively implicated the federal
government's authority, such as counterfeiting or treason.2'
Existing federal statutes generally covered four areas: "acts
threatening the existence of the federal government, ... mis-
conduct of federal officers,... interference with the operation
of the federal courts,... and interference with other govern-
mental programs."' Except in areas such as these, crimes
against individuals were originally subject exclusively to the
states' control.23
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
18. 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONSr. amend. YX
19. See Sara Sun Beale, Reporters Draft for the Working Group on Principles to
Use When Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277,
1278 (1995).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
22. Beale, supra note 19, at 1277 n.1.
23. See id. at 1278.
908
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME
During this period of nascent federal authority, the federal
criminal statutes that did exist "provided for concurrent state
court jurisdiction."' Ironically, this overlap was originally cre-
ated to curb federal power by allowing state courts to hear
federal criminal cases.' However, some came to view it as a
challenge to state sovereignty." For this reason, some state
courts even refused to accept jurisdiction in cases involving
federal criminal legislation.2' Congress responded by providing
exclusive federal jurisdiction for federal offenses."
After the Civil War, industrial growth prompted Congress to
expand federal criminal jurisdiction to include areas that had
before been exclusively within the states' domain.' 9 Unprece-
dented trade across state lines accompanied this growth and
created problems that were national in scope.
Senator James K. Jones of Arkansas expressed the main
sentiment when he argued that the steam engine and elec-
tricity had "well-nigh abolished time and distance" and that
monopolies, so-called trusts, were "commercial monsters"
that required the "iron hand of the [federal] law" to be
"heavily" laid on in order to protect... iberty....
The Sherman Antitrust Act' soon followed, regulating indus-
tries and imposing criminal penalties for outlawed conduct.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 687, 695 (1835) ( An offense
against the laws of the United States is an offense against the laws of South Caroli-
na; and she has the right to punish it.").
26. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 306-07 (1989).
27. See id. (citing State v. McBride, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 400 (1839) (holding that
courts of one sovereign lack jurisdiction to try crimes against another sovereign)); see
also Jackson v. Rose, (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 35-38 (1815) (denying jurisdiction over federal
penalty action).
28. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1278 (citing Rev. Stat. § 711 (1874) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3231)). Today exclusive federal jurisdiction "includes crimes
committed on federal territory or outside the borders of the fifty states and acts com-
mitted solely against a unique federal interest, such as treason." Little, supra note 9,
at 1034.
29. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1278.
30. Ashdown, supra note 10, at 791 (quoting 20 CONG. REc. 1457 (1889)).
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
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[TIhis [trend of expansion] was a recognition of the great
changes that [were occurring] in the way business was car-
ried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been
local or at most regional in nature [were becoming] national
in scope. But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that
earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained
the authority of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce.
32
Citizens also faced other new threats, such as mail and lot-
tery fraud, which prompted Congress to criminalize misuse of
the mails.3 In an early case, In re Rapier,' the United
States Supreme Court condoned such an exercise of congressio-
nal power on the grounds that "federal authority could be em-
ployed to prohibit misuse of facilities provided by the federal
government." 5 Congress used this same authority to regulate
other interstate facilities, such as railroads." The creation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission signified the emerging
pattern of criminal legislation by "establishing a federal admin-
istrative agency, a regulatory framework, and a comprehensive
range of criminal as well as civil penalties."37 This authority
has developed into a broad power to regulate criminal behavior
reaching areas far beyond the original mail and transportation
based activities, e.g., failure to pay child support," fraudulent
identification of documents,39 and disruption of animal enter-
prises."
Following the expansion of federal power driven by expanding
industrialization and commerce, the Prohibition movement fu-
eled the next major expansion of federal power. Though limited
in scope to the prosecution of the sale or distribution of liquor,
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
33. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1279.
34. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
35. Beale, supra note 19, at 1279 n.7.
36. See id. at 1279.
37. Id. at 1279.
38. See Child Support and Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. §§ 228, 3563, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3793, 3769cc-3797 (1994).
39. See False Identification Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1738,
39 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994).
40. See Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1994); Beale
supra note 19, at 1282; see also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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the Eighteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
resulted in a tidal wave of federal prosecutions in the 1920s
and 1930s." The Amendment also provided for concurrent ju-
risdiction of state and federal courts resulting in the
overlapping enforcement model that is common today.42 The
Eighteenth Amendment is perhaps most notable because it
uniformly outlawed behavior not already against the public
policy of all the states." Therefore, by acting in concert with
the ratifying states, Congress was able to marshal power over
the states to an unprecedented extent.
The Prohibition movement also served as a harbinger of
further expansion of the federal government's power. Even after
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933, the tide of
federal jurisdiction never receded to its previous level." In the
period during and following the Great Depression, the political
climate was one of national crisis for which leaders sought
national solutions. "[Aln influential congressional committee
reported that the prevalence and severity of the crimes being
committed and the inability of the existing [law enforcement]
agencies to cope with them required federal action in 'a field
which had, until then, been regarded as primarily a matter of
local or State concern."'4 Accordingly, in the 1930s, Congress
passed many new federal laws which represented unprece-
dented ventures into areas affecting individuals and businesses:
bank robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and firearms regulation."
Because congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
had already been established, none of these laws broke new
legal ground. However, they did "reflect a growing willingness
on the part of [the New Deal] Congress... to assert jurisdic-
tion over an increasingly broad range of conduct clearly within
the traditional police powers of the states.
41. "In the peak year, 1932, there were 65,960 Prohibition-related criminal cases
in the federal courts." Beale, supra note 19, at 1279.
42. See U.
43. See Mihir A. Munshi, Comment, Share the Wine-Liquor Control in Pennsylva-
nia: A Time for Reform, 58 U. PIrr. L. REV. 507, 509 (1997).
44. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1279.
45. Id. at 1279-80.
46. See id- at 1280.
47. Id.
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The next phase of expansion came in the 1960s and 1970s in
attacks on organized crime.' The authority of the federal gov-
ernment reached a high water mark in Perez v. United
States.49 This case addressed a federal statute that broadly
targeted loansharking activity and made "extortionate credit
transactions" subject to federal prosecution. 0 Congress stated
"[elxtortional credit transactions are carried on to a substantial
extent in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where
extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate in charac-
ter, they nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign com-
merce."5 The Court required no explicit proof that the target-
ed criminal conduct had an effect on commerce; it merely re-
quired that the "prohibited class of activity [be] ... within the
reach of federal power."" This generous interpretation of the
Commerce Clause gave Congress unprecedented authorization
to regulate a given behavior.
Still, Congressional authority does have its limits, and the
decision in United States v. Lopez53 may help to define these
limits. In Lopez, the Court held that Congress' Commerce
Clause power does not authorize it to outlaw the possession of
a gun within 1000 feet of a school.54 The Court reasoned as
follows:
[The challenged statute] is a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of eco-
nomic enterprise.... [The statute] is not an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
48. See id
49. 402 U.S 146 (1971).
50. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 159 (1968)
(relevant section codified at 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
51. Id. at § 201(aX3).
52. Beale, supra note 19, at 1281. The rationale Professor Beale asserts is that a
court would have no power to enforce the law in cases where individual violations
resulted in only a trivial nexus with commerce. However, Justice Stewart thought
that "the Framers of the Constitution never intended that the National Government
might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity through the enact-
ment of federal criminal laws." Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
54. See id.; see also Dennis E. Curtis, Comment, Congressional Powers and Feder-
al Judicial Burdens, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1995).
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activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects inter-
state commerce.'
However, some argue that Lopez relied on procedural con-
cerns with the legislation at issue. Professor Beale points to the
majority's reliance on "the fact that there were no congressional
findings supporting the legislative judgment that the activity
affected interstate commerce."56 The suggestion is that in the
absence of any congressional findings, the majority could not in
good faith conclude that Congress had demonstrated that the
targeted activity had any effect on interstate commerce. There-
fore, if Congress had merely cited a factual study or some other
evidence, it is possible that the Court may have allowed the
ban.
Because the Court's quest for a demonstrated nexus seems to
contradict its analysis in Perez, other commentators argue that
Lopez was not decided merely on procedural grounds:
Lopez is clearly a substantive, principle-based decision, and
not a narrow procedural holding based on the lack of con-
gressional findings.... Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion for the Supreme Court rests on an analysis of the
scope of Congress' authority under the commerce power, and
his conclusion.., is that it is limited to the regulation of
"economic activity (which) substantially affects interstate
commerce." . . . [Chief Justice Rehnquist concludes that]
possession of a gun in a school zone does not qualify. Legis-
lative findings are mentioned briefly only as relevant to
analyzing legislative judgment and as an aid to "our inde-
pendent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause."5 '
Thus, Lopez may become the basis for legitimate future chal-
lenges to broad based federal authority over criminal activity.
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted).
56. Sam Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1007 n.112
(1995).
57. Ashdown, supra note 10, at 808-09 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63).
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At the very least, Congress' authority has been meaningfully
limited by Lopez, but the exact reach of the opinion has yet to
be delineated. Therefore, while Congress must approach law-
making with a keen awareness of Perez, lower courts have been
stingy in applying Lopez.58 "It may take another foray by the
Supreme Court into Commerce Clause criminalization to make
the [Lopez] message clear."59
The debate over the boundaries of Congressional authority is
important because it defines the limits of the debate over the
proper role of the federal government in fighting crime. Where
Congress cannot act under the present scheme, there need be
no argument over whether it should. However, within any pro-
scribed limits, issues of whether and how Congress should
criminalize behavior still persist.
III. PRELIMINARY IssuES AND Two EXAMPLES
Today, the federalization of crime is largely driven by politi-
cal will and the desire of Congress to address specific problems
it perceives to be important. Perception-driven legislation is one
of the key concerns that brings out many of the issues present
in the debate around federalization of crime. Legislation that
simply reacts to specific media events tends to overlook impor-
tant factors that impact the efficacy of such legislation. The
chief concern for many critics is that creating new federal
crimes overburdens the federal judiciary and threatens the
efficiency and fairness of the courts." However, before turning
to federal caseload concerns, it is important to first examine the
impetus for such legislation. Reactive, media-friendly legislation
raises basic questions unrelated to the caseload. These include
the quality of justice, strategic effectiveness, fairness of imple-
58. See id. at 809.
59. Id. at 809-10.
60. [P]olitics has driven Congress to federalize increasing numbers of
crimes. Largely in response to the rise in drug trafficking, which seem-
ingly has overwhelmed the capacity of the states to investigate and pros-
ecute extensive drug networks, Congress has passed numerous new feder-
al offenses.... The result has been that the criminal dockets of the
federal courts has increased by 46% over the last ten years (1981-1991).
Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Fifty-Eighth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: -The Treadmill
of Criminal Justice Reform," 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 5, 10 (1995).
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mentation, and the wisdom of a particular use of resources.
Such legislation, while momentarily attractive in light of con-
temporary media reports, is not necessarily consistent with good
public policy.
A. Anti Car Theft Act of 1992
The federal caijacking statute, the Anti Car Theft Act of
1992,61 is an example of event-specific federal crime legislation
having an unintended, undesirable outcome. This piece of legis-
lation was enacted at least partially, if not wholly, in response
to a single particularly grizzly incident of caijacking.'2 In Sep-
tember of 1992, Pamela Basu was killed by car thieves while
she was taking her daughter to nursery school in a prosperous
residential area outside of Washington, D.C. As the two thieves
drove her car away, Basu was entangled in the seatbelt strap,
and she was dragged for a mile and a half. The driver side-
swiped a fence in an attempt to dislodge her from the strap.
She died from internal injuries resulting from the incident. Her
child, though tossed from the vehicle by the assailants, was
miraculously uninjured.'
This horrifying event brought national attention to the then
unfamiliar crime of carjacking. Ironically, the attention generat-
ed by this event may have actually contributed to the spread of
the crime by sensationalizing it and portraying it as a recre-
ational crime often committed by thrill seeking youths.' In
response to this national attention, Congress hastened to pass a
law imposing federal penalties for carjacking. Pamela Basu's
61. Pub. L No 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384-3401 (1992) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (portions of the act
were repealed in 1994).
62. Armed "carjacking" was little known until a particularly vicious
attack in Maryland, when it was quickly legislated into a federal crime
in October 1992. This occurred despite the fact that the Maryland offense
was committed wholly intrastate and had been promptly prosecuted by
state authorities, resulting in life sentences for both defendants.
Wallace, supra note 10, at 21; see Georgann Wing, Putting the Brakes on Carjacking
or Accelerating It? The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 385 (1994).
63. See Wing, supra note 62, at 390-91.
64. See id. at 386. Though some perpetrators were motivated by economic reasons
and sought to profit from the sale of stolen cars, youths began to see carjacking as a
new, though more violent, form of joyriding. See id. at 397.
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story served as a compelling backdrop for the campaign. Even
as he signed the bill into law, President George Bush referred
to the story: "We cannot put up with this kind of animal be-
havior. These people have no place in decent society, and...
they can go to jail and they can stay in jail and they can rot in
jail for crimes like that."65 On the floor of Congress, at least
four members of Congress referred to the Basu incident, includ-
ing newspaper accounts admitted to the record by Senator
Pressler." Thus, the nation had a new problem, and along
with it, a new law.
Unfortunately, the new law was more of a campaign slogan
than a solution. "The majority of the legislative history behind
the Act's enactment ... focuses on a comprehensive plan for
taking the profit out of car theft rather than thoughtful reason-
ing behind the creation of the federal crime of 'armed
carjacking."' The result of this is that it may have created
another incentive to steal a car while it is in its owner's posses-
sion rather than from the parking lot.' Part of the law man-
dated more comprehensive and more costly marking of automo-
bile parts by manufacturers to facilitate tracking stolen
parts. 9 However, an exemption was allowed for manufacturers
who installed anti-theft devices as standard equipment.0
Therefore, when a "thiefs motive is to steal a car for its
parts... he will either learn ways to get past the continuing
array of new anti-theft devices installed in vehicles, or the thief
will take the easier route and bring the crime to the driver in
the form of caijacking."7'
Thus, the real problem may not be the federalization of
crime, but the "politicalization" of crime.72 This danger arises
65. President George Bush, Remarks in St. Louis, Missouri, Sept. 28, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednews File.
66. See Mary C. Michenfelder, Note, The Federal Carjacking Statute: To Be or
Not to Be? An Analysis of the Propriety of 18 U.S.C. S 2119, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1009, 1010 n.6 (1995).
67. Id. at 1015 n.47 (emphasis added).
68. See Wing, supra note 62, at 439.
69. See 49 U.S.C. § 33107 (1994).
70. See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 33106 (1994).
71. Wing, supra note 62, at 439.
72. See J. Anthony Kline, Comment, The Politicalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1087 (1995).
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when the political process drives the legislative process. This, in
turn, often results in legislation that is very different from
what sounded attractive behind the campaign podium. The
original problem goes unaddressed while legislators reap politi-
cal gain. Indeed, the fact that the perpetrators of the Basu
incident were tried, convicted and sentenced to life in prison by
state prosecutors in a state court raises questions about the
need for a new federal carjacking solution in the first place."3
At the time, other than heightened awareness of the problem,
there was nothing to suggest that the states were not able to
address the problem without federal help. ' Subjecting certain
behavior that is already a crime under state law to federal
criminal regulation creates a classic example of the law of unin-
tended consequences.
B. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Another example of how federalization results in outcomes
that are inconsistent with Congressional intent is the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). '5 Created in response
to the perceived demand for political candidates to "get tough
on crime," federal sentencing schemes take a different approach
from state schemes and often yield grossly different results. For
example, states often consider more aggravating and mitigating
factors in the sentencing process, allowing more tolerance for
departures from strict sentencing guidelines. 6 Also, states
more often consider intermediate sanctions before resorting to
incarceration." Therefore, where the effect of a strict prison
term would ripple out to an offender's family by imposing an
73. While Maryland does not have a specific caijacking statute, it did have mur-
der, robbery and kidnapping statutes which were used to prosecute the perpetrators
of the Basu carijacking. See Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 1065 (1994). After the
Basu incident, Maryland passed its own carijacking statute. See MD. ANN. CODE Art.
27, § 348A (1995); see also Price v. Maryland, 681 A.2d 1206, 1209 (1996).
74. See Michenfelder, supra note 66, at 1046; see also Washington Report: State
Chief Justices Oppose Senate Crime Bill Provisions, CRiM. JUST. NEWSL., Feb 15,
1994, at 1.
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994).
76. See Karen Lutjen, Note, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Mini-
mums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the
Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETiC S & PUB. POL'Y 389, 430 (1996).
77. See id.
1998] 917
UNiVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:905
economic hardship, a state sentencing guideline may allow for a
flexible work release program.
The result is two systems of prosecution for the same crimi-
nal behavior which create vastly different consequences for
those convicted, depending on the forum. Similarly situated
offenders now receive radically different sentences. 8 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Williams,79 the recommended state
sentence for a drug violation was eighteen months. However,
the federal scheme required a mandatory minimum sentence of
ten years, and the Guidelines recommended terms ranging from
twelve to fifteen years for one defendant and fifteen to nineteen
years for the other." In another case, a defendant faced a five-
year mandatory minimum sentence where the corresponding
sentence in state court would have been zero to ninety days.8'
In yet another case, the difference between prosecution in feder-
al and state court resulted in zero jail time for one defendant
and a ten-year federal sentence for the other.
This inconsistency creates a "cruel lottery"' which, at best,
undermines respect for the system (particularly at the state lev-
el) and the law it enforces, and, at worst, is grossly unfair.
While some might argue that this "crueling up" of the criminal
justice system only serves to create more of a disincentive to
engage in criminal behavior," critics argue that there is little
support for this. Scott Wallace, a former counsel to the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee, asks, "[bly what suspension
of disbelief have we come to suppose that 'making an example'
of every 20th offender advances the goals of certainty and uni-
formity of punishment that underlie the deterrent function of
the law?"85
78. See Beale, supra note 56, at 984.
79. 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1078-79 (D. Utah 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d
1337 (10th Cir. 1992).
80. See Beale, supra note 56, at 998.
81. See id. (citing United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 1569 (1994)).
82. See id. (citing United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d. 300, 305 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1120 (1994)).
83. Id. at 997.
84. See Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain Confronting the
Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 522-23
(1997).
85. Wallace, supra note 10, at 21.
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The deterrence rationale for harsher sentences is not without
its flaws. The deterrent force is weaker than appears when one
considers that the typical criminal, especially a repeat offender,
is less risk averse than the average citizen.86 Indeed, jail time
may even serve to enhance an individual's reputation within
certain populations. 7 Furthermore, considered in economic
terms, harsher sentences associated with additional federal
criminalization can be counterproductive: "When possession or
sale of a good is criminalized, the inherent uncertainty of being
caught permits risk-takers to charge a high price for that good.
Increasing the expected sentence thus creates opportunities for
true profit. Dealers of criminalized goods are high-risk takers
whose markets and profits are expanded by criminalization."88
Lastly, the social stigma often associated with jail time, while
viewed by many as a further deterrent, can produce results
that inhibit any rehabilitative effect of incarceration. Once
branded with a criminal record, freed prisoners may be less
inclined to re-integrate into traditional society.89 One criminal
explained, "I can remember.., on more than one occasion...
going into a public library near where I was living, and looking
over my shoulder a couple of times before I actually went in,
just to make sure no one who knew me was standing about and
seeing me do it." °
These flaws are inherent in any sentencing scheme, and they
pose difficult problems for which there are no easy answers.
But to the extent the Guidelines rely on traditional assump-
tions that may be faulty, increasing the number of acts for
which those sentences may be imposed is unsound public policy.
Perhaps the most troubling flaw in the Guidelines is the
disparity created in comparison with state systems. The struc-
tural disparity created by the parallel but unequal state and
federal systems undermines the rationale for the stricter federal
86. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (suggesting that some criminals prefer risky activities).
87. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 ICH. L. REV. 2385, 2415
(1997).
88. Id. at 2415-16 (emphasis in original).
89. See id.
90. Id. at 2460 (quoting TONY PARKER & ROBERT ALLERTON, THE COURAGE OF
HIS CONVICTIONS 111 (1962)).
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sentences.9' The Federal Sentencing Commission, which sets
the guidelines for sentencing in federal court, was created for
the purpose of eliminating sentencing disparities within the
federal system.9 2 "[T]he deliberate selection of only a handful
of [cases subject to both state and federal jurisdiction] for
harsher treatment reintroduces the same disparity that Con-
gress sought to eliminate when it reformed the federal sentenc-
ing process."" Thus, increasing federalization may only frus-
trate what Congress set out to do by creating harsher, though
more uniform, federal sentences.
Still, the tasks of Congress are generally so large in scope,
there is little that it can do that will not result in some unin-
tended and perhaps unforeseeable consequences. Also, because
the system of democracy, in theory, creates policy that has the
greatest appeal to the greatest number, media coverage of indi-
vidual events will, perhaps legitimately, continue to drive the
legislative process. But the federal caijacking law and the
Guidelines provide two examples that raise questions about the
participation of the federal government in criminal law issues
otherwise left to state legislatures. Any faults with state and
local level strategies do not necessarily justify a reflexive, na-
tional response to particular events which happen to be high-
lighted in the media. Such responses, while politically gratify-
ing, can be ineffective and even costly.
The next portion of this comment examines some of the po-
tential systemic costs of federalization and the issues they im-
plicate.
IV. THE FEDERAL CASELOAD
There is a strong argument that the federalization of crime
has and will continue to overwhelm the federal court system
with criminal cases. During the period between 1980 and 1993,
the number of filings of criminal cases increased by 70%. 4 The
number of criminal trials increased by 43% while civil trials
91. See Beale, supra note 56, at 982.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See Ashdown, supra note 10, at 803.
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decreased by 19%. 5 Drug cases accounted for 44% of criminal
trials96 during that time period. The federal prison population
more than tripled.9" Firearms prosecutions more than quadru-
pled.9" In 1996, drug cases accounted for 55% of all criminal
appeals." Federal judges battle swollen dockets, and prosecu-
tors juggle increasing caseloads."° Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ex-
plains:
We seem to assume that judges can perform the same qual-
ity of work regardless of the number of cases they are as-
signed. That simply is not correct. Most of us are now
working to maximum capacity. As a result, when our case-
load increases, we inevitably pay less attention to the indi-
vidual cases.10'
However, statistics have varied over time, and "comparisons
between any two isolated years, without an appreciation of the
overall array of filing statistics, can yield wildly varying conclu-
sions."0 2 While the number of federal criminal prosecutions
has changed, the number stood at similar levels in 1977 as well
as 1995."° As the federal judiciary has grown, the caseload
per judge has dropped.'"
Furthermore, when compared to state judges, the federal
bench's criminal caseload per judge is far lower than the typical
caseload for state judges.' In 1992, federal judges in the
95. See id. at 805.
96. See id. at 804.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 803.
99. See id. at 804.
100. See, e.g., The Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cas-
es: A Plea to Save the Federal Courts, A.BA J., Jan. 1993, at 52.
101. Id.
102. Little, supra note 9, at 1040 (citation omitted).
103. In 1995, criminal cases accounted for only seventeen percent of all filings in
federal court, compared to roughly one-third in 1977. See Beale, supra note 19, at
1283. In 1932, there were more than 86,000 criminal cases filed compared to 45,500
cases filed in 1994. See Little, supra note 9, at 1040.
104. Still, with over 3000 federal crimes and a relatively inelastic number of feder-
al judges, the numbers are sure to rise. Also, the threat to speedy dockets comes in
another form: unfilled judicial appointments. This issue lies beyond the scope of this
comment.
105. See id. at 1042.
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Northern District of California faced four times fewer criminal
filings than the average filings in state superior courts for the
counties composing the Northern District.'" Thus, "the argu-
ment that federal judges simply cannot handle more criminal
cases is at least open to question in light of what state court
judges are being asked to accomplish."10 7
In light of competing statistics and the varying conclusions
they suggest, it becomes apparent that the analysis of the fed-
eral caseload is better examined in a different way. Notwith-
standing variations in the numerical data, there is a systemic
threat attributable to federalization: the changing character of
the federal caseload, which is shifting more towards weapons
and narcotics cases."° This may well be the root of the criti-
cism of the federalization of crime. For it is not the numbers
but the proportion that is problematic: "too many criminal cases
can hinder the exercise of careful judgment and threaten a
reduction in the quality of justice in the federal system.""°
Thus, because, according to at least one study, "the absolute
number of criminal cases in the federal courts ... is not un-
precedented,"" it is this change in substance, rather than the
number of cases, that may most threaten the system.
Drug cases demonstrate the cost incurred due to the change
in the character of the caseload. Drug cases can pose an espe-
cially large threat to resources because "[iun the present ...
environment, drug cases, especially those involving the sale of
drugs, acquire special status. District Attorneys, state attorneys,
and other local, state, and federal officials are often requested
to redirect their efforts from other areas to the supposed 'crisis'
created by drug sales and drug use.""' Professor Beale offers
an anonymous anecdotal example in which a federal judge
noted during a drug case with fifteen defendants, that the
pending case was his third in less than one year with more
than twelve defendants." In each case, nearly every defen-
106. See id.
107. Id. (citation omitted).
108. See id- at 1043.
109. Id- at 1046.
110. Beale, supra note 19, at 1285.
Ill. Martin & Travis, supra note 6, at 74.
112. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1286.
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dant required appointment of separate counsel, who then each
had to separately review government documents and tape re-
cordings. Because of the number of motions and status confer-
ences accompanying the trial of such a case, these cases
disproportionately consume more judicial resources than civil
cases.
113
The number of drug prosecutors from the past decade have
increased without comparison in other time periods and, thus,
uniquely illustrate the threat of overload represented by this
imbalance. From 1980 to 1987, the total number of federal drug
offense prosecutions increased 153%, with prosecution rates in
drug cases higher than those of any other type of crime. The
number of defendants convicted in federal courts increased by
more than 340%." Accordingly, for the same time period, the
number of defendants sentenced to prison for federal drug pos-
session charges increased by 434%."' The average sentence
imposed by federal courts increased by 44%."' Thus, combined
with the special attention that drug cases demand, the increase
in proportion of drug cases is especially problematic.
Compounding the resource drain of increasing complexity of
criminal litigation are the Guidelines, 7 which require exten-
sive findings of facts and legal conclusions. 8 In one study,
90% of judges surveyed reported that sentencing had become
significantly more time consuming.'19 Another study found
that the sentencing process in cases involving the Guidelines
took 25% more time than in other cases.' Moreover, these
sentences may be appealed by either the government or the
defendant, even where the defendant pleads guilty."2
The increased proportion of criminal cases necessarily de-
creases the proportion of resources available for disposition of
113. See id
114. See Martin & Travis, supra note 6, at 75.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994).
118. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1286.
119. See id. at 1286-87.
120. See UL at 1287.
121. Also, the sentencing appeals process further complicates ordinary appeals from
criminal cases. See id
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civil cases. One of the causes for this "civil squeeze" is the
Speedy Trial Act' (the "Act"), which requires that criminal
cases be tried within seventy days from the filing date of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared in court, or whichever is later." While there is a
good argument that, because of generous exclusions provided for
in the Act, criminal cases have no real trumping power over
civil cases," the Act appropriately pressures prosecutors to
move cases quickly into court.' This pressure restricts the
resources available for civil cases which, enjoying no similar
priority status, must inevitably be delayed. Thus, while criminal
cases account for only about 17% of all filings in federal court,
they consume 48% of the court's time."
This squeeze raises serious concerns about the nature of the
federal docket and the ability of the federal courts to fulfill
their constitutionally mandated duty: "interpreting federal law,
declaring federal rights, and providing a neutral forum for in-
terstate disputes."" Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, chair of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law, wrote a
letter to Congress illustrating this point:
[Tihe federal courts are designed to handle complex crimi-
nal cases... with nationwide impact that states lack the
resources and/or jurisdiction to investigate and prose-
cute.... [T]he potential addition to the federal caseload of
thousands of cases that the states routinely and efficiently
prosecute would severely reduce if not cripple the federal
courts' ability to handle those types of cases that we are
best able-and geared-to handle."
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994).
123. See id. § 3 161(c)(1).
124. See Little, supra note 9, at 1051; see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1994).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (1994).
126. See Beale, supra note 19, at 1285.
127. Beale, supra note 56, at 988-989; see also Justin Wiser, Payne: Beware of Too
Many 'ederalizing' Laws, VA. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 24, 1997, at Al (quoting United
States District Court Judge Robert E. Payne: "We've created a circumstance in which
civil dockets are backlogged .... The consequence of all that is that there's a de-
cline in the quality of federal judiciary decision-making.").
128. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from
Civil Rico, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 86 n.413 (1996) (quoting 139 CONG. REc. S15, 398
(remarks of Sen. Biden, presenting letter of Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, chair of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law)).
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Considering the unique nature of the federal courts and their
relatively tiny size in comparison to the state court sys-
tem-there are less than 700 federal judges nationwide-we
should not lightly ask the federal courts to shoulder an addi-
tional task that state courts are already equipped to perform.
This situation is lost in the blare of the media spotlight that
often drives event-specific criminal legislative agendas.
V. THE OumooK REEVALUATiNG PRINCIPLES AND
SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
There is some consensus among experts that the current
balance of federal versus state involvement in law enforcement
is closer to ideal than not. "[T]he states should and must con-
tinue to play the dominant role in criminal law enforcement,
and the federal government's role should remain far more limit-
ed than that played by the states."" Given that today's state
court systems handle 90% to 95% of criminal cases prosecuted
in the United States, the status quo doesn't seem too far from
ideal. Still, this does not address the problems that the current
system precipitates: haphazard, media-driven criminal legisla-
tion, disparity in sentencing, and bulging federal caseloads.
There are many specific proposals and approaches addressing
the federalization issue that are beyond the scope of this com-
ment. However, there are some guiding principles that may be
usefully summarized.
A. Demonstrated State Failure
Advocating for the viability of a system of mixed federal and
state courts, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "the national and state
systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE." 1'0 According to
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, "Hamilton didn't mean that
literally... [but his] statement suggests the next step that
state and federal courts can take towards improving judicial
129. Beale, supra note 19, at 1294.
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis in original).
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federalism. We need to view our systems as one resource and
use that resource as wisely and efficiently as we can." 3'
One such approach involves a threshold standard for federal
criminal legislation in order to limit future federalization with-
out denying the legitimate benefits it offers: remedying demon-
strated state failure.3 2 This would require a comparison of
state and local versus federal realities, which avoids the prob-
lematic and sometimes disingenuous characterization of a crime
as having a peculiarly state or federal nature. It avoids the
problematic task of defining exactly where the line between
federal and state interests lies: "'Unique' federal interests is too
limited; Intrastate commerce' is too broad; and 'strong' federal
interests is too manipulable."" In this context, state failure is
not a quantitative judgment based only on docket crowding;
rather, it is a qualitative judgment that also takes into account
workload, resources, investigative expertise and opportunity,
and law enforcement's familiarity with and presence in the
community." 4 This creates a two way street for making the
decision about whether to proceed under a federal or state
system. States can assert their particular needs in a case, and
federal officials can intervene, even over a state's objection,
when they demonstrate some remediable state shortcoming,
such as the civil rights prosecutions during the 1960s."
This appeals to those who criticize the current system on
federalism grounds. It establishes a presumption that the states
will take care of local problems. Where the states either cannot
or are not doing a sufficient job with the resources available to
them, the federal government can fill in the gaps. Thus, in in-
stances of corruption or systemic illegality, the federal govern-
ment would fulfill its duty to protect its citizens and assume
the role of enforcer. Where local law enforcement is over-
whelmed, they can form partnerships with federal law enforce-
ment officials to maximize both federal and state crime control
efforts. Both of these situations are examples where federal
131. William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Fed-
eral Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1992).
132. See Little, supra note 9, at 1078.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1078-79.
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courts appropriately shoulder the caseload. For "at least in
some urban areas today it may be federal resources, the federal
forum, and incapacitating federal penalties that stand between
a plausible attempt to address the behaviors and total govern-
mental abdication."'36
The threshold for such a demonstration should be more than
"a simple assertion of state failure ... [and, indeed] it seems
unlikely that a single instance [of failure] should suffice." 37
"Failure" is intended to mean only that there is a need going
unaddressed by the local authorities; it need not necessarily
attach blame.' States and localities would likely be evaluat-
ed on an individual basis; but if there is some regional failure
demonstrated among several neighboring states or localities, a
regional response would be appropriate under this model. "Con-
gress would have to be convinced, rationally, that despite the
state's efforts (good faith or otherwise) to address the crimes at
issue, the results have been inadequate to protect the public
interest."'39 Any decision made by Congress would be analo-
gous to Congress's appropriation function, and would, therefore,
not likely be appealable.'
It is important to recognize that the demonstration compo-
nent distinguishes this use of federal resources from the current
rationale that, generally speaking, states cannot address their
crime problems alone.' It requires more than just a general-
ized sense that crime is getting worse. Even where there is a
particularly egregious event, it is unlikely that such an event,
while it may pave the way to passage of bills in the current
scheme, would suffice to show demonstrated state failure. This
would preclude passage without a rationally convinced body
voting for it. There may even be imposed a judicial requirement
for "rational basis in the record."' Still, one must acknowl-
136. Id. at 1079.
137. Id at 1080.
138. See id. at 1078.
139. Id- at 1080.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
141. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
142. Little, supra note 9, at 1080 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557
(1995)).
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edge that if an event is enough to galvanize Congress today, it
will probably also galvanize it tomorrow.
Nonetheless, the demonstrated state failure model raises
difficult issues that would persist to complicate the implementa-
tion of such a plan: defining a failure, establishing the burden
one must meet to adequately demonstrate a state failure, ruling
out or creating an avenue for appeal, deciding whether to in-
volve a new or existing independent agency, and others. These
uncertainties notwithstanding, the principle does serve to guide
future debate about how the federal and state governments
should interact as they combat crime. Furthermore, and per-
haps most importantly, the model "articulates a rationale for
many instances of past criminal federalization ... .
B. Project Exile
To completely address federalization issues, the debate must
touch the laws that are already on the books. While most crit-
ics of federalization call for a halt to future legislation, few call
for a wholesale repeal of federal criminal law.'" This is, in
part, because the federal laws do have positive impact. As a
viable, though perhaps belated, rationale for present federal
law, the principle of demonstrated state failure offers some
guidance in this area. Because the state failure model is based
on a system of feedback between localities and the federal gov-
ernment, once a failure is demonstrated, this partnership must
continue.
An example of such a partnership is a program called 'Pro-
ject Exile." Established in November of 1996 in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, the project demonstrates a new approach to gun violence
in mid-sized cities.' The program's name comes from its
143. Id. at 1081.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1071 ("[Regarding future legislation, a] starting point ought to
be a rebuttable presumption against federalization.... However, any such presump-
tion must be rebuttable because all participants in this debate appear to agree that
federalization of crime is appropriate or necessary in some circumstances.").
145. See Michael Janofsky, Homicides Rise in Smaller Cities, NEW ORLEANS TIMa-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 15, 1998, at As ("Contrary to the trends that show homicide rates
falling in many of the country's largest cities since 1994, some cities with populations
of several hundred thousand are experiencing increases in killings.").
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mandate that all felons caught with guns be prosecuted in
federal court, "without regard to numbers or quantities."
146
Therefore, according to United States Attorney Helen F. Fahey,
due to harsher federal penalties, "[i]f you are found carrying a
gun... you will be exiled from our community to a federal
prison."'47 While this may contribute to the docket squeeze
complained of by critics of federalization, the high profile gener-
ated by a strong publicity campaign maximizes any deterrent
effect.' Also, eliminating prosecutorial discretion addresses
concerns of unfair and arbitrary disparity in sentencing experi-
enced by similarly situated criminals prosecuted in different
systems. By advertizing the project's slogan, "[an illegal gun
will get you five years in federal prison,"" on billboards, tele-
vision, and radio, the project takes the publicity past the pas-
sage of a federal law and spreads a message of uniform enforce-
ment.50
The project began in response to Richmond's murder rate,
which was higher than that of similar sized cities. Larger cities,
on the other hand, had crime rates which were falling.'5'
Richmond is a mid-sized city not seen traditionally as an urban
center comparable to New York or Washington, D.C., but it had
146. Project Exile Press release materials provided by S. David Schiller, Senior
Litigation Counsel, United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
[hereinafter Schiller Materials].
147. Lynn Waltz & Tim McGlone, Criminals Arrested for Carrying Guns... Task
Force Aims to Take Them out of Violent Hands, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR,
Jan. 23, 1998, at B1 (ellipsis in original).
148. The prosecutorial effort is accompanied by "affirmative use of the media carry-
ing the message 'an [sic] illegal gun will get you five years in federal prison."
Schiller Materials, supra note 146. The message is transmitted by "15 billboards, a
fully painted city bus, TV commercials, 15,000 business cards with the message dis-
tributed on the street by local police, [and] print advertising." Id.
149. Id.
150. This use of the media should be distinguished from the use by legislators in
the passage of laws to address specific events. See Wallace, supra note 10; see also
supra text accompanying note 60. While the use of the media to disseminate Project
Exile's message does have positive political fallout for the few elected involved, its
main use is to deter crime by educating the population about the consequences of
specific behavior.
151. "New York and Los Angeles recorded the lowest number [of homicides] in de-
cades. Homicides were also down in Chicago, Washington, New Orleans, Boston, Bal-
timore, and Newark, N.J., as they were in several other Virginia cities." Carrie John-
son, Drugs Guns Apathy... Where Toll Went Down, Residents Got Involved, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 1998, at Al.
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been dubbed "one of the nation's murder capitals."'52 Drug
dealers from other major markets began to perceive it as a
place to expand their business because there was relatively
"little organized crime or gangs.""5 Also, the city's location on
Interstate 95 facilitated transportation to and from major drug
distribution centers such as Miami and New York.' These
factors, combined with aggressive policing in larger cities, drove
drug dealers to seek new markets in Richmond and other mid-
sized cities.'55 Therefore, "[a]ny entrepreneur with a gun"'
saw Richmond as a "wide-open drug market."' 7 This bred the
competition that was beginning to wane in larger cities, but
escalated violent crime in Richmond." "In established drug
rings, dealers aren't likely to kill their customers because it's
bad for business ... [b]ut in Richmond, the situation is more
volatile."'59 Learned D. Barry, a Deputy Commonwealth Attor-
ney, described the change in Richmond's criminal climate:
"When I first started back in 1978, there were about 55 mur-
ders a year and the average person was shot once or twice....
Now there are up to 140 murders a year, and the corpses are
riddled with bullets.""6
Faced with this dilemma, law enforcement officials saw
tougher federal sentencing as an answer.' Captain William
Robertson of the City of Richmond Police Department explained
that, "it is like buying a car: we're going to the place we feel
we can get the best deal. We shop around." 2 State sentences
tend to be lower, in part because legislatures and sentencing
commissions face intense local pressure to keep the costs of
152. Mark Holmberg, City Slaying Level Lowest in a Decade: Henrico Is Off to Its
Worst, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1998, at B1.
153. Johnson, supra note 151, at Al (quoting Assistant United States Attorney
James B. Comey).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. (quoting Deputy Commonwealth Attorney Learned D. Barry).
159. Id. (paraphrasing Dr. Jay Albanese of Virginia Commonwealth University's
Criminal Justice Department).
160. Id.
161. Interview with Captain William Robertson, Officer in Charge of Detective Di-
vision, City of Richmond Police Department (March 13, 1998) [hereinafter Robertson
Interview].
162. Id.
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justice down."6 Because stricter sentencing yields a larger and
more costly prison population, legislatures like Virginia's often
cannot "fund" new stricter sentences.' Therefore, local law
officials welcomed federal intervention.
1s
This specific threat noted by experts and law enforcement
officials," not a generalized public mood, is an example of
what may constitute grounds for federal involvement based on
demonstrated state failure. It is likely that nearly all communi-
ties believe their crime rates are too high, but the above facts
indicate that the traditional tools used by states and localities
to combat crime were not effective in Richmond. Accordingly,
the United States Attorney's Office in Richmond sought to in-
tervene by promising federal prosecution to all convicted felons
caught with a firearm.
The project's high-profile presence in the community has had
some positive effect. According to anecdotal accounts: "When the
police jump out at drug corners, dealers are dropping their
weapons before they run instead of running with them because
they don't want to get caught with guns."6 7 The project is ful-
ly privately funded, primarily by community merchants as well
as in-kind donations by media and other local organizations."
Statistically, the project appears successful. The rate at which
criminals carry guns has decreased by more than fifty per-
cent."c9 Thus, through targeted, cooperative efforts, local and
163. See id.
164. This is in part due to the fact that the Virginia Constitution prohibits the
state from incurring debt that would create a budget deficit. See VA. CONST., art. X,
§ 9; see also Frank Green, Corrections Has Grown Inmate Population Has Grown
Faster, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 12, 1997, at Al ("Getting tough on criminals was
good politics during the 1993 gubernatorial campaign. By 1997, it turned the Virginia
Department of Corrections into the state's biggest agency.").
165. Captain Robertson noted that Commonwealth Attorney David Hick's office was
"overloading" the state courts with cases, and accordingly, state judges and prosecu-
tors saw Project Exile as needed relief. See Robertson Interview, supra note 161.
166. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 152.
167. Johnson, supra note 151, at Al (quoting Assistant United States Attorney
David Schiller).
168. See Schiller Materials, supra note 146.
169. See id. The numbers on the city's murder rate remain mixed. Reports in 1998
suggest that in Richmond the rate will be much lower than in years past. See Mark
Holmberg, City Slaying Level Lowest in a Decade Henrico Is Off to Its Worst Start,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1998, at BI. However, 199Ts rates kept the city high
on the list of those with the highest rates in the country: "There were 140 homicides
1998] 931
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:905
federal law enforcement agencies partnered with private com-
munity members and achieved some impact in an area that
was of special concern to Richmond residents. This approach
appears to be a useful and efficient use of overlapping state
and federal jurisdiction to leverage better results.
Programs such as Project Exile still have flaws and are not
the answer to every crime wave. Indeed, local leaders in Rich-
mond still voice some concern that the impact has not fully
reached violent crime. 7 ' Also, the project relies heavily on a
potentially flawed premise, that prison is a solution to crime.
"Exiling" people convicted of crimes does have an impact, but it
may not ultimately be the best long-term solution for a given
community.
Of course any increases in incarceration have some effect
through incapacitation, and incapacitation of a large enough
fraction of the population will necessarily bring about some
crime reduction (as would imprisoning all males between
the crime prone ages of 15-24). [However, the] dominant
expert view is that further increases in sentence length
will, at best, bring about modest reductions in crime, while
measures not being pursued hold more promise. 7'
Therefore, programs such as Project Exile run the risk of being
a substitute for more long-term measures of crime prevention
such as commitments to job and education programs.' 2 In-
deed, because any government program is paid for out of a
limited budget, building another prison to house the "exiled"
necessarily means that another public project will go unfund-
ed.73
in Richmond in 1997, up from 119 in 1995 and 112 in 1996." Johnson, supra note
151, at Al.
170. City Councilman James L. Banks, Jr., chairman of the public safety commit-
tee explains, "we just haven't found the right combination [of law enforcement pro-
grams] to reduce the murder problem here in Richmond." Johnson, supra note 151, at
Al.
171. Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psycho-
logical And Other Non-legal Factors Influencing The Development of (Federal) Crimi-
nal Law, 1 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 23, 26 (1997).
172. "Tlo reduce street crime, [we must reduce] poverty by investing in children,
youth, families, and communities." Coramae Richey Mann, We Don't Need More Wars,
31 VAL. U. L. REV. 565, 575 (1997) (quoting THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 215 (Steven
R. Donziger et al. eds., 1996)).
173. Though Project Exile is privately funded, increased costs of trials and incar-
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Furthermore, resorting to federal prosecution may exacerbate
the problem of docket crowding. In theory, this should be miti-
gated by the screen represented by the demonstrated state
failure principle. But in those districts where the threshold is
met, the recipient federal court will no doubt feel the increased
burden: "There is an increasing tendency to look to the federal
judicial structure to solve a great many of society's prob-
lems. . . ' This, in turn, taxes the efficacy of the entire sys-
tem." 4 For this reason, following the state failure model is
necessary to avoid even further pressure on the federal system
except in areas where additional resources are most needed. 5
Before moving on to other criteria by which to examine the
need for federal law enforcement resources, it is important to
note that Project Exile is not a justification for more federal
legislation; rather, it is a model for intelligently using tools
already in existence.' The apparent early success of the pro-
ject did depend on the prior existence of federal laws. But what
makes the project unique is its constructive use of those laws.
By combining local police presence, federal prosecutory resourc-
es and penalties, and a strong public awareness campaign, the
United States Attorney's Office has avoided the hurdles pre-
sented by the overlap of federal and state criminal authori-
ty'" and produced an effective program to achieve a greater
sum than the federal and state parts comprise. Thus, what has
been achieved is not due to legislative action, but rather cre-
ative and cooperative enforcement by members of the executive
ceration are nonetheless left to the public sector.
174. Wiser, supra note 127, at Al (quoting United States District Court Judge
Robert E. Payne).
175. It must be acknowledged that Project Exile prosecutions are the type. of drug
and gun cases that this article criticizes as responsible for the majority of the in-
crease in federal court prosecutions. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10. How-
ever, in the context of a demonstrated state failure, the federal court should be seen
less as a system in distress and more as an appropriate tool to augment state law
enforcement efforts.
176. See Robertson Interview, supra note 161. Captain Robertson expressed his
personal opinion that while he wished some federal laws did not exist, "if they're
there, we'll use them." Id. He explained that the local police never encountered an
area of crime not already addressed by federal law. See id.
177. These hurdles include securing funding, avoiding "turf consciousness" among
various levels of law enforcement agencies, coordinating with the court, United States
Marshals, and prison personnel, and obtaining the commitment of investigative agen-
cies to pursue cases. See Shiller Materials, supra note 146.
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branch. Accordingly, there is a need not only for legislative
acumen, but also creative and thoughtful execution of the laws
created. Where both exist, federalization schemes are likely to
be more successful and draw less criticism.
C. Other Criteria
This article has focused primarily on federal laws that mimic
pre-existing state laws. There are, however, situations in which
federal interests justify national legislation for reasons other
than creating a duplicative system of tougher sentences. Feder-
al law will often exist in the absence of similar state legisla-
tion, because states have no unique interest to protect. There-
fore, in order to address those instances, other criteria must be
considered in determining the threshold for federal interven-
tion.78
First, federal interests are obviously strong "where the feder-
al sovereign is directly involved."'79 This occurs where the of-
fense is committed against the sovereign itself or directly impli-
cates the sovereign's property. Therefore, crimes such as trea-
son or crimes in which federal property is damaged or de-
stroyed should obviously be subject to federal prosecution."8
178. Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr identifies similar criteria to those that follow
in the text:
The Federal Judicial Conference to Congress, the policy-making division
of the federal judiciary, has recommended that Congress voluntarily nar-
row its authority by passing criminal legislation only when a "para-
mount" federal interest justifies a federal enforcement effort. It identified
five categories of crimes that may reflect such an interest: (1) offenses
against the federal government or its programs; (2) criminal activity with
substantial multi-state aspects; (3) criminal activity involving complex
commercial or institutional enterprises most effectively prosecuted with
federal resources and expertise; (4) serious, high-level or widespread state
or local government corruption; and (5) conduct that threatens individual
civil rights.
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The High Cost of Federalizing Crime, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Mar. 6, 1998, at 6.
Still, the above categories would arguably not apply to an area of demonstrated
state failure where there is no other interest than the public interest in safety and
law enforcement traditionally advanced by the states. Thus, the state failure scheme
advanced earlier would be more permissive.
179. Beale, supra note 19, at 1296.
180. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 104 (repealed 1943) (criminalizing acts giving aid to an
enemy of the United States).
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Second, "where efficiency based considerations favor federal
prosecution because of the interstate or international character
of the offense, or economies of scale,"' 8 federal criminal legis-
lation is appropriate. Therefore, "where the conduct threatens
to overwhelm the local authorities,"'82 because of substantial
multi-state aspects, federal resources play an important role in
protecting citizens. One example, Section 242 of Title 18 of the
United States Code,"s addressed the activities of the Ku Klux
Klan following the Civil War and criminalized violations of civil
rights.' Where states could not or would not enforce the
common law because of widespread corruption and racial
prejudice, a federal law was created to provide a remedy."
Third, federal legislation is important "where uniformity is
[especially] important, as in the context of antitrust and securi-
ties regulation." " In diffuse and complex areas of law such as
those regulating vast capital markets, individual states lack the
ability to effectively regulate crimes committed in connection
with such commercial activities. Accordingly, federal securities
laws 8 provide a comprehensive regulatory and enforcement
scheme that benefits the regulated by providing uniformity as it
protects the public.
While these criteria demonstrate the important interests that
are implicated by any federalization scheme, they still do not
end the analysis. For example, they do not define exactly when
federal agencies have a distinct law enforcement advantage over
state agencies. Thus, while many local officials take advantage
of extensions of federal jurisdiction in order to trigger stricter
sentencing systems, this alone may not justify more federal
legislation." Tougher penalties are the subject of much de-
181. Beale, supra note 19, at 1296.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (punishing the deprivation of civil rights under the
color of law with fines and/or prison time).
184. See Andrew J. Simons, Note, Being Secure in One's Person: Does Sexual As-
sault Violate a Constitutionally Protected Right?, 38 B.C.L. REV. 1011, 1033 (1997).
185. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social Con-
struction of the Black Self, 40 HOW. L.J. 1, 99 (1996).
186. Beale, supra note 19, at 1296.
187. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
188. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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bate,189 and to create laws in order to take advantage of such
penalties may base new laws on a faulty premise.
The Project Exile model serves as an important experiment
in this area. Its success lies in its "whole government" ap-
proach. 90 By selecting areas of failure and addressing those
areas with a consistent and cooperative enforcement scheme,
law enforcement officials achieve new efficiency at lower costs
to the system. New federal legislation alone, without the coordi-
nation of the executive and judicial branches, will not be suffi-
cient to replicate the success demonstrated so far by Project
Exile.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent statistics are good news, regardless of their cause.
Innovative and creative programs like Project Exile seem to be
making a difference and are encouraging examples of new ap-
proaches to solving old problems. But the fact remains that
there will always be crime. It is a part of the human condition.
Accordingly, the public debate on crime will continue as policy
makers seek better ways to address the problem.
In step with the expansion of modern federal jurisdiction,
Congress will continue to keep the nation's crime problem on
its agenda. Because of the crucial role that media exposure
plays in winning elections, lawmakers can stake out campaign
territory by highlighting new threats and proposing new laws.
Politicians amass more political currency by publicizing immedi-
ate responses tailored to specific media events, such as the
Pamela Basu tragedy, than by seeking more comprehensive
long-term solutions. Imposing longer sentences may appeal to
some, but those sentences do nothing to prevent the conditions
that breed crime. Thus, reactionary policies such as these only
create a patchwork of last ditch efforts to punish without re-
gard to prevention or rehabilitation.
There is no silver bullet to fighting crime; neither state legis-
latures nor Congress can solve the problem with any one crime
189. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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bill or sustained war on crime. That is what is demonstrated
when reactive, media-friendly legislation targets a problem that
momentarily galvanized so many, only to precipitate a number
of new issues and unforeseen consequences. A better approach
is the more comprehensive approach. Instead of passing new
laws, policy makers should pursue new ways to involve all
three branches of government to more effectively use the tools
already in place. Community building programs such as "mid-
night basketball" 9' should be promoted for their crime pre-
vention value instead of attacked as "soft on crime," "big gov-
ernment" programs."'
To this end, the demonstrated state failure model provides a
useful tool in evaluating federal involvement in local law en-
forcement. The federal government is a valuable resource which
should be available where the states cannot or will not address
a particular problem. In implementing programs according to
this principle, however, goals should be set according to the
demonstrated failure on the state's part. Thus, where there is
no failure in enforcement, such as in Pamela Basu's case, 93
there should be a presumption against federal involvement. Any
failure in the Basu case was not in the prosecution, but in the
prevention of that crime. Accordingly, it may be in the area of
191. "Midnight Basketball was the popular name given to a proposal in
the 1994 Crime Bill. In these prevention programs, towns would open
their recreation facilities to young men during late night hours. In order
to participate in the late night games, the youths would be required to
meet certain standards such as attendance in school or education work-
shops, and to meet a code of conduct. In some programs, if a youth got
in trouble with the law, he was expelled from the league. These pro-
grams received significant support from law enforcement officials. One
town reported a 60% reduction in drug related crime after the midnight
sports league was formed.
Jennifer M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About Getting Tough:
Juvenile Justice and The Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 Am. CRiM. L. REV.
1299, 1344 (1996) (citing Richard A. Mendel, Prevention or Pork: A Hard-Headed Look
at Youth-Oriented Anti-Crime Programs, AM. YoUTH POLy F. (1995)).
192. Opponents of such programs accused supporters "of diverting needed prison
construction monies to 'increase the self-esteem of young criminals and to pay for
midnight basketball leagues.... ' [Olpponenta thus hoped to encourage the public to
link the bill to old political mythologies about 'welfare queens' and other frauds."
Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 563-64
(1996).
193. See supra note 73, and accompanying text.
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crime prevention that the federal government's resources are
most appropriately spent.
There are other issues that remain unaddressed by this com-
ment but deserve mention. Managing a court's docket is done
on an ad hoc basis, and there are probably as many approaches
as there are courts and clerks. One judge may perceive justice
better served by speeding through as many cases as possible,
while another may see the attention given to some cases worth
the delay of others. And when there is adequate court time, one
judge may maintain a faster pace in the interest of uniformity,
while another may seek a different, more time consuming ideal.
Ultimately, the public has competing interests, and a careful
balancing of those interests by officers of all three branches of
government is vitally important.
Finally, as suggested earlier, it is imperative to note that the
solution to any community's crime problem cannot ultimately
come from either states or the federal government.
The only thing the police and the courts can do is bail out
the boat. The only ones that can stop the leak are families
and schools. It is difficult for ordinary citizens to under-
stand the impact of good schools or a loving family, but the
effects are really far-reaching.194
The best approach is to recognize that crime is not a problem
to be solved, like an unbalanced budget; rather it is a condition
to be prevented or, once manifested, treated.
Charles D. Bonner!
194. Carrie Johnson, Drugs + Guns + Apathy ... Where Toll Went Down, Resi-
dents Got Involved, RiCH. TIMMS-DISPATCH, January 3, 1998, at Al (quoting David
Baugh, a criminal defense attorney and former Assistant United States Attorney.)
* The author would like to thank Ed Noonan and the staff of the University of
Richmond Law Review.
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